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( When hiring an employee who will have access to confidential
business information, employers often include in the employment
contract a provision restricting the employee's rights to use or dis-
close confidential information upon termination of employment
("post-employment restraint agreements"). Although an employee
is in any case under an implied legal obligation not to disclose val-
uable business secrets,1 express agreements are used to put the em-
ployee on notice both as to the existence of the obligation 2 and as
to what information the employer considers confidential.' Under
I See, e.g., By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 164, 329
P.2d 147, 151 (1958) ("Every employee is under the implied obligation not to divulge or use
confidential information which he acquires by reason of his employment."). This obligation
is often identified in cases involving the disclosure or use by former employees of secret
manufacturing processes. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244
U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (breach of confidential relationship is threshold question in an action
for theft of trade secrets against a former employee); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton,
361 Mass. 835, 843-44, 282 N.E.2d 921, 926-27 (1972) (former employees of beverage-dis-
penser manufacturer breached duty of confidentiality by using a confidential report on
product improvements, prepared for their former employer, in their own competing busi-
ness); Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 80-81, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1946) (relying on im-
plied-contract theory to enjoin former employees from reproducing and using former em-
ployer's secret manufacturing processes); Glucol Mfg. Co. v. Schulist, 239 Mich. 70, 74-75,
214 N.W. 152, 153 (1927) (former employee enjoined from using former employer's secret
manufacturing process in competing business).
2 See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 554 (D. Conn. 1964) (con-
fidentiality agreement "specified a part of the standard required by the duty of fidelity of
each employee to the employer"); Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 6, 138
N.E. 485, 486 (1923) (post-employment restraint contracts "merely express the implied con-
tract of one who enters into such an employment not to carry elsewhere into competition
with his employer confidential knowledge obtained from him").
3 See, e.g., Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 407 (C.C.W.D. Mich.
1908) (notice to employee of information's secrecy a necessary element of trade-secret ac-
tion); Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 372 Mass. 835, 840, 364 N.E.2d
799, 802 (1977) ("At the very least [the confidentiality agreement] put the employees on
notice that secrets were involved."); Ultra-Life Laboratories, Inc. v. Eames, 240 Mo. App.
851, 866, 221 S.W.2d 224, 232 (1949) (contract not to teach or divulge processes and meth-
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such a provision, an employee may agree not to work for a compet-
itor of the employer or establish a competing business,4 or may
agree to limit his disclosure of specified information in the event
he continues to work in the industry.5
Modern American contract law, following the English common
law, generally enforces agreements between competent parties.6 As
a rule, therefore, courts will not engage in ex post inquiries regard-
ing the substantive fairness of contract terms,7 partly because of
the difficulties inherent in such subjective inquiries., Post-employ-
ment restraint agreements, however, have not been accorded this
presumption of validity. Courts have viewed such agreements with
disfavor for centuries,9 and the modern rule is that they will be
ods held an admission that such materials were secret).
I See, e.g., National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc. v. Avers, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 287, 311
N.E.2d 573, 575 (1974) (agreement not to sell hearing aids or accessories in a portion of New
England for two years); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., Inc., 189 A.D. 556, 558,
179 N.Y.S. 325, 327 (1919) (agreement not to engage in photographic- business for two
years); Caicade Exch., Inc. v. Reed, 278 Or. 749, 752, 565 P.2d 1095, 1096-97 (1977) (agree-
ment not to compete in the truck-dispatching business for two years).
5 See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173,
1183 (D. Ariz. 1973) (agreement not to disclose confidential information, including that re-
lated to the employer's products, costs, pricing practices, customer lists, and financial
records, for two years); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle, 317 F. Supp. 633, 635 (W.D. La. 1970)
(agreement not to disclose "trade secrets, confidential procedures, data and drawings"); Glu-
col Mfg. Co. v. Schulist, 239 Mich. 70, 72-73, 214 N.W. 152, 152 (1927) (agreement never to
disclose employer's formulas for manufacturing paste).
6 See, e.g., Eldridge v. Johnston, 195 Or. 379, 405, 245 P.2d 239, 251 (1952) (public
policy dictates that contracts between competent parties be enforced); 1 ARTHUR CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 127 (1963) (courts will refuse to inquire into adequacy of considera-
tion and will enforce contracts as written, unless fraud, mistake, or undue influence can be
shown); cf. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcON. 293, 293-94
(1975) (criticizing the increased willingness of courts to abandon the "classical conception of
contract at common law [which] had as its first premise the belief that private agreements
should be enforced in accordance with their terms").
7 See PATRICK ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 398-405 (1979)
(from 1770 to 1880, coincidence between general contract principles and free-market eco-
nomic theory led to an emphasis on the bargaining process, rather than on the substantive
fairness of the contract terms).
8 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 70 (2d ed. 1977).
' See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307, 353 N.E.2d
590, 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (1976) (disfavor results from "'powerful considerations of
public policy' ") (quoting Purchasing Assocs. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y. 2d 267, 272, 196 N.E.2d 245,
247, 246, N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (1963)); Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 9, 138
N.E. 485, 488 (1923) (courts of equity will enforce restrictive covenants only to the extent
necessary to protect plaintiff's trade secrets); Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 160, 29 S.E.2d
543, 546-47 (1944) (citing the plight of the "needlessly pauperized" individual as justifying
this disfavor); Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711); Clerk v. Governor & Co. of
Taylors of Exeter, 83 Eng. Rep. 670 (1685); The Blacksmiths of South Mims, 74 Eng. Rep.
485 (C.P. 1587). See generally WILLIAM A. SANDERSON, RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN ENGLISH LAW
7-47 (1926) (tracing the evolution of the modern approach to post-employment restraint
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enforced only to the extent that a court finds the agreement
reasonable.' 0
The willingness of courts to make independent judgments
about the reasonableness of post-employment restraints imposes
significant costs that would be avoided by the general rule of non-
intervention. A reasonableness inquiry entails the difficult assess-
ment of an employer's commercial needs and an employee's subjec-
tive desires and preferences. An incorrect assessment of either may
cause the invalidation of an economically beneficial agreement.
Furthermore, the uncertain validity of these contracts creates an
incentive for employees to breach -the agreement, 1 resulting in
both misuse of valuable information and increased litigation. An
employer, afraid of "guessing" wrong and thus compensating an
employee for entering into an agreement that may later be held
unenforceable, 12 will be less willing to rely on such agreements and
will require more of a wage sacrifice from employees who are given
access to confidential information. Finally, to the extent that the
reasonableness inquiry results in more involved court proceedings,
litigation costs increase. Because of these costs, the differential
treatment accorded post-employment restraint agreements re-
quires a countervailing justification.
Courts have advanced three grounds to justify examining the
agreements).
10 See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dewberry, 204 Ga. 794, 802, 51 S.E.2d 669, 675
(1949) ("While it is the general rule that a contract in general restraint of trade is void, a
contract only in partial restraint may be upheld, 'provided the restraint be reason-
able . . . .' ") (quoting Kutash v. Gluckman, 193 Ga. 805, 807, 20 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1942));
American Broadcasting Cos. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 404, 420 N.E.2d 363, 367-68, 438
N.Y.S.2d 482, 486-87 (1981) (express post-employment restraints are subjected to a reasona-
bleness inquiry because of their potentially anticompetitive effect and their threat to the
employee's ability to earn a living); Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 158, 29 S.E.2d 543, 545
(1944) (post-employment restraints are void unless shown to be reasonable); see also Han-
dler & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 669, 755-56 (1982) (concluding, after exhaustive analysis of case law on contracts in
restraint of trade, that "[a]ll ancillary restraints that are reasonable in purpose, geographic
scope and duration are valid both at common law and under federal antitrust law, absent
significant anticompetitive impact"); infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (discussing
current approach to post-employment restraint agreements).
1 The employer necessarily discloses confidential information and performs its obliga-
tions under the contract before the employee has fulfilled his obligations. Thus, if the gain
to the employee exceeds the expected penalty, the employee has the incentive to use the
confidential information without complying with the contract. The incentive to breach is
increased to the extent that post-employment restraint agreements are not enforceable. See
Rubin & Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STuD. 93, 101
(1981).
"2 See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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reasonableness of post-employment restraint agreements. 13 First,
such agreements are considered anticompetitive14 because they re-
strict both the mobility of skilled workers and the flow of informa-
tion essential to a competitive economy.15 Second, the agreements
are considered unfair because employees, who are viewed as unso-
phisticated or lacking in bargaining strength, are thought fre-
quently to be unable to obtain full payment for the restrictions
imposed on their ability to earn a living.'6 Third, though this argu-
ment is not much relied upon today, these agreements were once
considered a threat to the economy because they could remove a
productive person from the work force. 17
After briefly discussing the development of the law governing
these agreements, this comment examines the validity of the three
justifications offered for disparate treatment of post-employment
restraints. Whatever merit these rationales may once have had,
they no longer justify the reasonableness inquiry. First, the view
that such agreements are anticompetitive results from too narrow
13 See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348-50 (Ch. 1711) (stating the three
policy concerns thought to justify judicial intervention in this class of contracts).
14 See, e.g., Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 33, 274 A.2d 577, 581 (1971)
(citing state antitrust laws for the proposition that an employer has no protectible interest
in limiting competition); 1st Am. Sys., Inc. v. Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 57 (S.D. 1981) (en-
forcement of nondisclosure clauses is limited because they vest the owners of information
with monopoly power).
15 See, e.g., Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sciences Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 254,
267, 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (1980) (restricting the use of post-employment restraints "pro-
motes the public interest in labor mobility and the employee's freedom to practice his pro-
fession and in mitigating of monopoly"); Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d
303, 307, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (1976) ("[O]ur economy is premised on
the competition engendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas."); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment c (1981) ("[The likely injury to the
public [from a post-employment restraint] may be too great if it is seriously harmed by the
impairment of [the employee's] economic mobility or by the unavailability of the skills de-
veloped in his employment.").
16 See, e.g., Scbmidl v. Central Laundry & Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823 (Sup. Ct.
1939) ("The inequality in bargaining power between employer and employee have [sic] led
the Courts to require a stronger degree of necessity before enforcing a covenant not to la-
bor."); Reading Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Bertolet, 454 Pa. 488, 492, 311 A.2d 628, 630 (1973)
(the "inherently unequal bargaining positions" of the parties justify close scrutiny of post-
employment restraint agreements).
17 See, e.g., Tarr v. Stearman, 264 Ill. 110, 119, 105 N.E. 957, 961 (1914) (emphasizing
public interest in promoting the optimal use of each person's talents); Moorman & Givens v.
Parkerson, 127 La. 835, 838, 54 So. 47, 47 (1911) (overly broad post-employment restraint
agreements may cause the, employee to become a public charge); Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C.
154, 159, 29 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1944) ("grave consequences of unemployment demand that"
post-employment restraint agreements "be examined and weighed with care"); Herreshoff v.
Boutineau, 17 R.I. 3, 5, 19 A. 712, 712 (1890) (reasonableness inquiry necessary to prevent
"unprofitable idleness").
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an understanding of competition and from the failure to consider
the extent to which such agreements foster competition by provid-
ing an incentive for research and development. Second, because
the employees most likely to be subject to post-employment re-
straint agreements are highly sophisticated, employer overreaching
is usually unlikely. Finally, the composition of the work force is
such that society need not fear that these agreements might en-
tirely remove potentially productive workers from the labor mar-
ket. The comment concludes that abolishing the exceptional treat-
ment of post-employment restraints would make contract law more
coherent: the generally applicable doctrine of unconscionability
would provide sufficient protection against employer misbehavior.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAw GOVERNING POST-EMPLOYMENT
RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS
Post-employment restraint agreements historically have been
governed by judge-made law.18 The origins of the modern approach
to post-employment restraint agreements are found in several En-
glish decisions dating back to the fifteenth century. The first re-
ported case to consider an agreement not to engage in a trade was
the Dyer's Case, decided in 1414.19 While it is unclear from the
report whether the noncompetition agreement at issue arose in the
context of a sale of a business or of employment, the case has been
cited repeatedly for the proposition that such agreements in either
context are void as restraints on trade.2 0 This per se rule was reaf-
IS See Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 10, at 756-66 (collecting cases). Although several
states now have statutes governing the validity of these agreements, they generally codify
the judge-made rules. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16,600-16,602 (West 1964); MICH.
COMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 445.761, 445.766 (West 1967); N.D. CEN. CODE § 9-08-06 (1959).
" Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (1414). The report states that the court was of the
opinion that because such agreements were illegal, the defendant, who had claimed satisfac-
tion of the obligation, might have demurred. Although the plaintiff was allowed to proceed,
the judge reportedly said, "By God, if the plaintiff were here he would go to prison until he
paid a fine to the King." ("[P]er Dieu si le plaintiff fuit icy il irra al prison, tanque il ust fait
fyne au Roy.") Id. In 1587, a blacksmith was jailed when he sought enforcement of a non-
competition agreement; he was later freed on a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that
the justice of the peace had no authority to imprison him. Regarding the agreement itself,
however, the report states that the "Court was clear of opinion, that it was void because it
was against law." The Blacksmiths of South Mims, 74 Eng. Rep. 485, 485 (1587).
20 The Dyer's Case was cited in the sixteenth century for the proposition that express
agreements restraining the practice of a trade were invalid per se. In 1578, an action for
debt against a merchant's former apprentice for breach of a covenant not to engage in trade
was not allowed. Anonymous Case, 72 Eng. Rep. 477 (Q.B. 1578). The report contains no
details, but cites the Dyer's Case as authority for refusing to enforce the covenant. For
modern cases citing the Dyer's Case, see United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Arthur Murray Dance
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firmed in 1602 in Colgate v. Bacheler,2' which held void a covenant
not to engage in a trade even though the restriction was of limited
duration and geographic scope and could be removed by the pay-
ment of a sum of money. The court stated that such restrictions
are "against the benefit of the commonwealth" and that, regardless
of the scope of the restriction, the defendant "ought not to be
abridged of his trade and living."22
The modern approach, replacing per se invalidity with a rea-
sonableness inquiry, first appeared in 1711. In Mitchel v. Reyn-
olds,2 the lessor of a bake shop agreed to pay the lessee fifty
pounds if the lessor engaged in the trade of baking within the par-
ish for the duration of the term of a five-year lease. Holding the
contract enforceable, the court noted that although covenants not
to compete are to be presumed invalid, in some circumstances they
may be reasonable.24 General restraints, which prohibited the prac-
tice of a trade throughout the kingdom, "must be void, being of no
benefit to either party. ' 25 Limited restraints, on the other hand,
which operated only in a particular locale, were considered en-
forceable if the consideration was sufficient to show that the agree-
ment was reasonable.26 Mitchel v. Reynolds thus abandoned the
rule of per se invalidity of the Dyer's Case, but still subjected the
restraint to a rebuttable presumption of invalidity, which could be
overcome only if the court deemed the terms of the agreement
reasonable.2 7
Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
21 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (Q.B. 1602).
22 Id. at 1097.
23 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711).
24 Id. at 351-52. Although the case concerned a covenant incident to the lease of a busi-
ness, Mitchel also addressed the use of such agreements between employers and employees.
The court explained that covenants not to compete have great potential for abuse in the
employment context, and that they are thus subject to close scrutiny when so used. Id. at
350. The distinction between covenants incident to the sale of a business and those incident
to employment, with less deferential treatment of employment agreements, has remained.
See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dewberry, 204 Ga. 794, 803-04, 51 S.E.2d 669, 675-76
(1949) (public policy requires that workers not be allowed to bargain away their labor mobil-
ity, but that restrictive covenants in the sale of a business be enforced in order to promote
such sales); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 703-04 (Ohio C.P.
1952) (discussing reasons for differing treatment and stating that weight of authority recog-
nizes the distinction).
25 24 Eng. Rep. at 348. This statement suggests that general restraints were considered
unreasonable per se and therefore void.
26 Id. The court stated that "a man may, upon a valuable consideration, by his own
consent, and for his own profit, give over his trade; and part with it to another in a particu-
lar place." Id. at 349.
27 Id. at 351. The court gave three rationales for this approach: that such agreements
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The Mitchel v. Reynolds approach has survived virtually un-
changed to the present day.28 The reasonableness of a restraint is
usually determined by balancing the legitimate interest of the em-
ployer (which must be more than a mere interest in restraining
competition) against the employee's interest in labor mobility. If a
court decides that the agreement protects a legitimate interest of
the employer, and does so without unduly limiting the employee's
mobility, it will be enforced. 9
restricted the employee's ability to earn a living; that they cost society the services of a
productive member; and that they were potentially monopolistic. Id. at 350.
The courts' abandonment of the per se rule seems to have been motivated by an im-
plicit recognition that all commercial contracts by definition restrain trade and that some
agreements that restrict trade in the literal sense may in fact be procompetitive. See United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-81 (6th Cir. 1898) (applying a Mitchel v.
Reynolds-type analysis in a suit brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act), modified and aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1911)
(establishing the rule-of-reason analysis under the Sherman Act). In Herreshoff v. Bou-
tineau, 17 R.I. 3, 4, 19 A. 712, 712 (1890), the Rhode Island Supreme Court discussed how
this more sophisticated view of competition led to the abandonment of the per se rule for
post-employment restraint agreements:
[After the Dyer's Case,] it was soon found that, to some extent at least, such contracts
help rather than harm both public interests and private welfare; that they are neces-
sary to trade itself, in order to secure the sale, at fair value, of an established business,
by protecting it against the immediate competition of the seller; also to enable one to
learn a trade or get employment from another, free from the risk of having the knowl-
edge and influence thus gained used to the employer's damage; to encourage invest-
ment in business enterprises under reasonable safeguards; and for other equally evi-
dent reasons.
28 See supra note 10. The development of the law of restraint of trade in England since
Mitchel has paralleled its development in this country. See, e.g., W. SANDEmsoN, supra note
9, at 25-47 (tracing the development of the law since Mitchel and concluding that "the
modern test now approved by the House of Lords is practically an application of the princi-
ples laid down in Mitchel v. Reynolds to the circumstances of present-day life").
29 In Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982), a hearing aid distributor unsuccess-
fully sought to enforce a one-year, statewide noncompetition agreement against a former
salesman. The Utah Supreme Court set forth the current standard:
Covenants not to compete are enforceable if carefully drawn to protect only the legiti-
mate interests of the employer. The reasonableness of a covenant depends upon several
factors, including its geographic extent; the duration of the limitation; the nature of the
employee's duties; and the nature of the interest which the employer seeks to protect
such as trade secrets, the goodwill of his business, or an extraordinary investment in
the training or education of the employee ...
In a general sense, the law balances the nature of the interest of one seeking to
enforce such a covenant, whether by injunction or by stipulated damages, against the
hardship imposed on the employee as a result of the restraint. . . .Covenants not to
compete which are primarily designed to limit competition or restrain the right to en-
gage in a common calling are not enforceable.
Id. at 627 (citations omitted); see also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walker, 251 Ga. 536, 537,
307 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1983) ("Covenants against competition which are contained in employ-
ment contracts are considered to be in partial restraint of trade and will be upheld only if
they are strictly limited in time and territorial effect, and are otherwise reasonable consider-
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Such a balancing approach is inherently subjective and uncer-
tain in application." This uncertainty is compounded by the fact
that courts vary in their treatment of these contracts once they are
deemed unreasonable. In most jurisdictions, agreements will be re-
cast to conform to the court's view of what is reasonable under the
circumstances.3 1 A second approach, the so-called "blue pencil
test," renders agreements with unreasonable terms void, unless the
offending provisions are grammatically severable from the con-
tract's reasonable terms.3 2 Finally, some courts will hold a restric-
tive agreement unenforceable in its entirety if any part of it is
found unreasonable.3
ing the business interest of the employer sought to be protected and the effect on the em-
ployee."); Harwell Enters., Inc. v. Heim, 276 N.C. 475, 480-81, 173 S.E.2d 316, 318-19 (1970)
(applying balancing-of-interests analysis). But see Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F.
Supp. 838, 843, 846 (D. Conn. 1976) (granting preliminary injunction against former em-
ployee on reasonableness grounds despite broad geographic and temporal scope of
agreement).
30 Compare Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 700 (4th Cir. 1955) (refusing
to enforce five-year noncompetition agreement against former Welcome Wagon hostess),
and Briggs v. Boston, 15 F. Supp. 763, 768 (N.D. Iowa 1936) (same), with Welcome Wagon
Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 248-49, 120 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1961) (enforcing five-year
noncompetition agreement against former Welcome Wagon hostess), and Briggs v. Butler,
140 Ohio St. 499, 511, 45 N.E.2d 757, 763 (1942) (same); compare National Hearing Aid
Centers, Inc. v. Avers, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 290, 311 N.E.2d 573, 577 (1974) (refusing to
enforce two-year noncompetition agreement against hearing aid salesman on ground that no
legally protectible interest was at stake), with Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 390-
91, 42 S.E.2d 352, 354-55 (1947) (enforcing one-year noncompetition agreement against
hearing aid salesman/manager on reasonableness grounds without inquiring into nature of
information transferred).
31 See, e.g., Eastern Distrib. Co. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 675, 567 P.2d 1371, 1379
(1977) (upholding judicial recasting of geographic scope of noncompetition agreement on
grounds that "equity should not permit an injustice which might result from total rejection
of the covenant merely because the court disagrees with an employer's judgment as to what
restriction is necessary to protect his business"); R.E. Harrington, Inc. v. Frick, 428 S.W.2d
945, 951 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (allowing Missouri court to rewrite overly broad post-employ-
ment restraints to conform to the court's view of what restrictions are reasonable under the
circumstances).
11 See, e.g., Reading Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Bertolet, 454 Pa. 488, 493, 311 A.2d 628,
630-31 (1973) (refusing to enforce, under "blue pencil" test, agreement against key em-
ployee). The term "blue pencil test" originated from the traditional use by courts of a blue
leaded pencil when examining such agreements. See 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 6, § 1390, at
67-69 (1962). The blue pencil test allows courts to enforce post-employment restraints in
part, while enabling them to avoid "rewriting" the contracts. But because it produces "arbi-
trary and inconsistent results," Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 24, 325 N.E.2d
544, 546 (1975), the test has been discarded in some jurisdictions in which it was once ap-
plied. See, e.g., Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 1971) (referring to
the test as "legalistic"); Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 585, 264 A.2d 53, 60-61
(1970); Raimonde, 42 Ohio St. 2d at 25, 325 N.E.2d at 547.
3' See, e.g., Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 753, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4
(1973) ("when a restriction ... is too far-reaching to be valid, the court will not make a new
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The reasonableness inquiry that is employed where a post-em-
ployment restraint agreement is at issue stands in stark contrast to
the general rule of American contract law that courts will not, ab-
sent procedural irregularities, reexamine a bargain struck by com-
petent parties.3 4 While one may suspect that more than inertia has
sustained the reasonableness approach through centuries of judi-
cial decisionmaking, 5 it is worth examining closely the rationale
contract for the parties by reducing the restriction to a shorter time or to a smaller area");
Philip G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 211 Neb. 123, 130-31, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904-05 (1982)
(refusing, on grounds of overbreadth, to enforce post-employment restraint against former
partner); Note, Post Employment Restraints: An Analysis of Theories of Enforcement, and
a Suggested Supplement to the Covenant Not to Compete, 17 TULSA L.J. 155, 157-60 (1981)
(discussing this approach).
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.1, at 212 (1982) (attributing reluctance of
courts to evaluate substantive fairness of contract terms to the rise of the bargain theory of
consideration).
"I One explanation for the longevity of the reasonableness approach is its flexibility.
courts may, without changing their analytical framework, change the factors considered rele-
vant in determining what restraints are reasonable. See Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 94
Conn. 248, 252, 108 A. 541, 543 (1919) ("The public policy to be applied is the public policy
of the present time. The changing conditions of life modify from time to time the reasons
for determining whether the public interest requires that a restrictive stipulation shall be
deemed void as against public policy."). For example, courts may consider the research and
development costs incurred in modern, high-technology fields. See, e.g., Structural Dynam-
ics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1113-14
(E.D. Mich. 1975) (limiting enforcement of express nondisclosure agreements to information
that qualifies for trade-secret protection is too restrictive in "an area of knowledge and
rapid technological change such as the computer field"); Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation,
Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 647-49, 358 N.E.2d 804, 807-08 (1976) (reasonableness of covenants not
to disclose information regarding a high-speed data-acquisition module is determined in
part by the amount of time it would have taken to reverse engineer the product).
Another explanation that has been advanced for the continued vitality of the eight-
eenth-century approach is that it is the most economically efficient treatment of this class of
contracts. See, e.g., Rubin & Shedd, supra note 11. Rubin and Shedd argue that both par-
ties to these contracts have an incentive to behave opportunistically. Employees have an
incentive to breach by using information acquired from the employer to compete against the
employer. Id. at 101. Employers have an incentive to be overinclusive in their claims as to
what information an agreement covers. Id. at 101-02. Thus, the argument goes, it is econom-
ically efficient to enforce only those contracts that serve legitimate ends. But the incentive
to overreach exists in all contracts. Furthermore, the employer's tendency to include in
these agreements more information than is "reasonable" presumably can be counteracted
before the contract is signed. A breach by the employee, however, can be prevented only by
enforcing the contract. The employer may also lower the employee's compensation to ac-
count for the possibility of breach, but the usefulness of this tactic is limited by the fact
that an employer must compete with others seeking labor services, see infra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text, and by the potentially high value of the information transferred, see
infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text, and may only increase the employee's incentive to
breach in order to relieve himself of these effective payments. Therefore, the existence of
opportunities for overreaching does not justify the reluctance of courts to enforce these con-
tracts without conducting an independent evaluation of their reasonableness. Further, even
if the reasonableness approach prevents some overreaching, efficiency analysis should take
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for giving post-employment restraint agreements this special treat-
ment. In the absence of an articulable and cogent justification for
this departure from traditional contract principles, the approach
should be abandoned.
II. RATIONALES FOR THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF POST-
EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS
Modern cases rely principally on two rationales to justify the
harsh treatment of post-employment restraint agreements: the
possibility that such--grements will be used for anticompetitive
purposes (the "restraint-of-trade" rationale), and the fear of re-
stricting the employee's ability to earn a living (the "employee-
protection" rationale)." The cost to society of losing the services of
a productive individual (the "loss-to-society" rationale), although
occasionally mentioned, is relied upon less frequently.3 7 Implicit in
these rationales are certain assumptions regarding the nature of
competition and the type of market in which it can prevail, the
relative bargaining strength and degree of sophistication of the
parties, and the composition of the labor force. These sweeping as-
sumptions, however, do not withstand analysis.
A. The Restraint-of-Trade Rationale
In assessing the competitive impact of post-employment re-
straint agreements, two different markets must be considered: the
market for employee services and the market for the employer's
product. Post-employment restraints are said to facilitate the mo-
nopolization of the employment market because they limit the
ability of employees to sell their services to the highest bidder."
into account the added costs created by the reasonableness inquiry. See supra text accom-
panying notes 11-12.
'" See, e.g., American Broadcasting Co. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 404, 420 N.E.2d 363,
368, 438.N.Y.S.2d 482, 487 (1981) (underlying the strict treatment of post-employment re-
straints are "the general public policy favoring robust and uninhibited competition[, which]
should not give way merely because a particular employer wishes to insulate himself from
competition .... [and] the 'powerful considerations of public policy which militate against
sanctioning the loss of a man's livelihood' ") (quoting Purchasing Assocs. v. Weitz, 13
N.Y.2d 267, 272, 196 N.E.2d 245, 247, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (1963)) (citations omitted).
37 Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625, 686 (1960)
("Today, although [the loss-to-society] formulation is still occasionally repeated, the recog-
nized method of decision is that of balancing the employer's claims to protection against the
burden on the employee. Once the judgment is made, almost never does a court proceed to
consider possible injury to society as a separate matter.").
38 See, e.g., Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sciences Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 254,
267, 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (1980) (limiting the enforcement of post-employment restraint
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Once an employee has bound himself to a given employer, he can-
not move to a more profitable position or force the employer to
pay a competitive price for the employee's services.
This argument assumes in effect that competition for labor
can exist only in a spot market 9 and that all long-term employ-
ment contracts are, therefore, anticompetitive. Prior to entering
into such contracts, however, employers must compete for the ser-
vices of skilled employees. Furthermore, the parties can renegoti-
ate if another employer is willing to pay the employee more than
he is making under the agreement with his current employer.4' In-
deed, these contracts are indistinguishable in their competitive ef-
fects from other legitimate long-term commercial contracts. For
example, a ten-year output contract binds a supplier of a given
commodity for an extended period, thus removing a source of sup-
ply from the market. If competition exists at the time that such
contracts are entered into, however, the later lack of competition
for the goods or services does not render the contract illegal as a
restraint of trade.42
Because long-term contracts involving factors of production
other than labor are presumed valid, the differing treatment of la-
bor must rest on supposedly unique characteristics of employment
contracts. Theoretically, an employee may have lacked the sophis-
tication to solicit proposals from other employers before signing a
agreements serves to mitigate monopoly by promoting labor mobility).
39 Cf., e.g., American Broadcasting Co. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 404, 420 N.E.2d 363,
368, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482, 487 (1981) ("Underlying the strict approach to enforcement of these
covenants is the notion that, once the term of an employment agreement has expired, the
general public policy favoring robust and uninhibited competition should not give way
merely because a particular employer wishes to insulate himself from competition ..
(citations omitted).
40 See Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 683, 688 (1980) ("The question is not whether there will be competition among em-
ployers for labor and vice versa, but whether that competition will take the form of a spot
market for hours of labor or the form of a single contract for many services.").
41 A specific form of the fallacy [of confusing spot markets with competition, and con-
sidering long-term contracts monopolistic, is the argument] that contracts which re-
strict the right to change employment will prevent labor from moving to its highest
valued use. This is not the case, since the parties to the transaction can always retran-
sact. If an employee has a higher valued activity in some other employment, he can
offer a payment to his employer to obtain release from his contract, as is done in pro-
fessional sports.
Id.
42 Output and requirements contracts are enforceable. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1978) (al-
lowing such contracts while imposing a reasonableness limit on the amount of output ten-
dered or quantity demanded); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 2.15.
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given agreement 3 or lacked the means of obtaining the informa-
tion needed to compare opportunities. 44 Although these possibili-
ties are relevant to whether there was in fact competition for em-
ployee services in a particular instance, they do not explain how
long-term contracts as such are anticompetitive.
Post-employment restraints may also be thought to hinder
competition in the employer's product market. By preventing an
ex-employee from working within the industry or using informa-
tion obtained during employment, the employer may remove a po-
tential competitor from the market or deprive an existing competi-
tor of a valuable resource. 45 As a threshold matter, however, the
employer cannot affect competition unless he has a dominant posi-
tion in the product market. Where an employer lacks significant
market power, and therefore is a price taker, no action on its part
will have an appreciable and lasting effect on the market price.46
Moreover, even a firm with market dominance cannot use such
agreements to increase its market power or to charge a higher price
41 A party's lack of sophistication does not, however, invalidate other kinds of con-
tracts. Such treatment is not, in any event, desirable: it makes the fairness of the exchange,
rather than the propriety of the bargaining process, determinative of legality. This standard,
applied in the medieval English courts, died with the nineteenth-century application of free-
market economic theory to contract law. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 7, at 61-69.
44 See GEORGE STIGLER, Information in the Labor Market, in THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 191, 191-92 (1968). Stigler explains that a single wage for a given task will only
exist in a perfectly competitive labor market. In real-world labor markets, a wage differen-
tial will exist because workers will not have complete knowledge of the available wages.
Thus, the potential employee must expend resources in obtaining wage information. Be-
cause of the large number of potential employers in many fields, these search costs may be
too high for the potential employee to obtain data on all of the relevant firms. Id. at 201-03.
Beyond information problems, an employee's options might be limited by the industry-
wide use of restrictive post-employment agreements. While this might lessen the attractive-
ness of the employee's options generally, it does not lessen the competition among the pro-
ducers for the worker's services. Moreover, an explicit agreement among employers regard-
ing the terms to be offered to potential employees may constitute a violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Such a cartel, however, could only exert monopsony
power (a buyer's power to limit price) if the services of the prospective employees were of
greater value to the cartelized industry than to any other. Absent such a disparity in the
value of services, employees will sell their labor to industries that do not attempt to reduce
wages to the monopsony level. Thus, competition among industries for labor will prevent
the collusive use of such agreements in most circumstances.
15 See, e.g., Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sciences Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 254,
267, 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (1980) (promoting labor mobility fosters competition); First Am.
Sys., Inc. v. Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 57 (S.D. 1981) (restricting the flow of information
enhances monopoly).
46 See GEORGE STIGLER, Restraints on Trade in the Common Law, in THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF INDUSTRY 255, 257-58 (1968) (absent monopoly power, an employer is indifferent to
whether a former apprentice competes with him upon termination of the appren-
ticeship).
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in a given period. Post-employment restraint agreements merely
protect valuable information-they do not produce it or prevent a
competitor from producing its equivalent. By lowering the cost of
producing information, 7 these agreements would, if anything, de-
crease the price charged in the products market.
An employer with market dominance, however, may be able to
use post-employment restraints to prolong that position by reduc-
ing the dissemination of knowledge that would allow others to
compete effectively with the employer or by restricting the number
of potential competitors. For example, if an employer uses such
agreements to prevent the disclosure of information that would al-
low the duplication of the employer's production methods, he may
be able to retain whatever market power is attributable to those
methods. Or the employer may attempt to preserve market power
simply by preventing the employee from using his skills in compe-
tition with the employer. While the employee's ex ante demand for
compensation forces the employer to share some of the supracom-
petitive return, both parties are better off than if the market were
competitive.
That a post-employment restraint agreement may preserve an
employer's market power by restricting the spread of information
does not, however, imply that the agreement is anticompetitive.
While competition by way of product imitation and improvement
requires the free flow of information,48 an unlimited flow of infor-
mation would allow imitators to share in the benefits from infor-
mation without incurring the costs necessary to produce the infor-
mation. To the extent that inventors are prevented from reaping
the benefits of the information they develop, they are discouraged
from engaging in costly research and development, and competi-
tion will suffer because fewer products will be produced.49
47 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
48 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (patent law autho-
rizes limited monopoly for new inventions but compels disclosure; this provides an incentive
for creativity, yet ensures that when patents expire, monopoly will be quickly dissipated by
competition); see also Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 411, 414 (1983) ("[Imitation
makes the inventor] worse off than he would be if he had had an exclusive right to his idea,
because his competitors are enjoying the fruits of his labor and are not paying for it. Never-
theless, the public as a whole may be better off, as long as this freedom to imitate does not
destroy the incentive for people to come up with new devices.") (footnote omitted).
"' See von Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L. REv. 583, 584
(1961) ("[I]f the employer's trade secrets are not protected from appropriation by the em-
ployee or the unscrupulous, research and development will be impaired."); Developments in
the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. Rsv. 888, 947 (1964) ("Favoring protection [of
trade secrets] is the economic incentive it provides for continued innovation."). Of course,
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The law of intellectual property attempts to balance these
conflicting incentives. Patent law, for example, grants inventors a
seventeen-year right to the exclusive use of certain information in
exchange for the disclosure of the information.5 0 Trade-secrecy law
allows the developer of information that is unique, but insuffi-
ciently novel to warrant patent protection, limited property rights
to the information.5 1 When post-employment restraints merely
protect information to the extent allowed under one of the intellec-
tual property regimes, the agreement is no more anticompetitive
than the underlying law.
Not all information, however, is protected by an intellectual
property regime. When post-employment restraints are used by a
firm with market dominance to prevent the dissemination of infor-
mation that is not so protected, the anticompetitive effect of the
restraint might not be offset by the incentive to produce that justi-
fies the legal protection of information. Where a firm with market
dominance uses post-employment restraints to restrict the flow of
information that is not legally protectible, such agreements may be
anticompetitive.
Nevertheless, post-employment restraint agreements are not
used solely to prevent the disclosure of information; they are also
used to protect an employer's investment in the training of em-
ployees. Training by employers can produce two different kinds of
human capital: that which can be used only in the firm providing
the training ("specific human capital") and that which can be used
in other firms ("general human capital").52 The employee will be
willing to bear some of the cost of the latter, but not the former,
because training in general skills makes the employee more valua-
ble to all firms in the industry.5 3 Were an employee not willing to
accept lower wages in return for training, an employer who in-
even with no official protection for information, development would not cease entirely; in-
ventors would develop their own means of protection, but this would be extremely costly.
[I]f trade secret protection against the faithless employee were abolished, . . . [there
would be] an increase in the amount of self-help that innovative companies would em-
ploy. Knowledge would be widely dispersed among the employees of those still active in
research. Security precautions necessarily would be increased, and salaries and fringe
benefits of those few officers or employees who had to know the whole of the secret
invention would be fixed in an amount thought sufficient to secure their loyalty.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1974).
:0 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1982).
1 ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §§ 1.01, 2.01 (1984).
52 See GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 11-26 (1964).
53 Id. at 19-37. The employee might bear some of the cost of on-the-job training by
directly compensating the employer or by simply accepting lower benefits, such as a lower
wage.
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vested in training would suffer a loss of capital if the worker left
his employ for that of a competitor. The employee's willingness to
finance his acquisition of general human capital provides the em-
ployer with the incentive to train his workers in-house, rather than
requiring them to seek training elsewhere.5 4
The cost of acquiring general human capital may, however, ex-
ceed the worker's ability to pay for it. This problem arises, for ex-
ample, when very valuable information (which may not qualify as a
trade secret) must be disclosed to an employee55 or when the train-
ing required for a given job is very time-consuming or costly.5 6 In
these instances, once the employer has provided the training, he
still must recoup the uncompensated portion of his investment.
Because a competing firm has not financed the acquisition of the
skill or the development of the information, it can offer greater
compensation than that offered by the initial employer. Conse-
quently, the employee will have an incentive to leave for a compet-
itor after acquiring general skills and knowledge, at the employer's
expense, but before the employer has a chance to receive a return
on his investment.
The employer's only means of protecting his investment in
such capital is to prevent the employee from using his training or
divulging the acquired information for a given period. By so doing,
the employer effectively can convert the general human capital
that he has financed into specific human capital. Legal rules that
render express post-employment restraints invalid may, by remov-
5 Id. at 19-26. No trade-secret protection is accorded information that merely embod-
ies the general skills or knowledge obtained by an employee. See, e.g., Schulenburg v. Signa-
trol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 387, 212 N.E.2d 865, 869 (1965) ("It is clear that an employee may
take with him, at the termination of his employment, general skills and knowledge acquired
during his tenure with the former employer. It is equally clear that the same employee may
not take with him confidential particularized plans or processes .... "), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 959 (1966); Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 568,
217 A.2d 375, 385-86 (1966) (finding that employees of an operations-research company had
taken only increased general skills and experience from the firm); Junker v. Plummer, 320
Mass. 76, 79-80, 67 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1946) (former employees who built a replica of former
employer's shoe-manufacturing machine were found to have taken more than the allowable
"general skill or knowledge").
56 See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 11, at 96-97 (citing example of trade secret that may
be taught to a worker in one day, but that is worth $100,000 to the employer).
56 Some employers may be able to circumvent this problem. For example, because an
airline cannot contractually bind trainees for the period required to recoup its investment in
training, it relies heavily on the military, which can bind employees, to train pilots. See G.
BECKER, supra note 52, at 17 (well over 90% of the country's commercial pilots were trained
in the military). Another example is the M.D. or Ph.D. candidate who binds himself to a
lengthy period of research at the university that grants him the degree in exchange for a
heavily subsidized education.
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ing the employer's only means of protecting his investment, hurt
the competitive process by discouraging investment in human capi-
tal.
Thus, post-employment restraints are potentially anticompeti-
tive only in narrowly defined circumstances. First, the employer
must have market power in order for his actions to have an effect
on competition. Second, even where the threshold market position
exists, the post-employment restraint is not anticompetitive if it
covers information that the employer has a legal right to protect.
Where legally protectible information is involved, inquiry into geo-
graphic markets, the reasonableness of the time restraints, and the
relative bargaining strengths of the parties is irrelevant; it is a
waste of judicial resources and a potential source of judicial errors.
And, finally, even where no protectible information is at issue, the
agreement is not necessarily anticompetitive because post-employ-
ment restraints can protect the employer's investment in human
capital as well as in information.
Because competition in the employment market is not hin-
dered by post-employment restraint agreements, and because com-
petition in the product market is adversely affected only in a small
class of cases, neither a presumption of invalidity nor a broad rea-
sonableness inquiry is appropriate. Treatment according to general
contract principles is both less intrusive and less costly. And when
conditions are such that an anticompetitive use of a restraint oc-
curs, relief is available under the antitrust laws.57
B. The Employee-Protection Rationale
The employee-protection rationale for scrutinizing post-em-
ployment restraint agreements rests on the importance of the per-
sonal freedom or mobility of workers. 8 But personal freedom in-
'7 The federal antitrust laws are broadly phrased to prohibit most anticompetitive ac-
tivity. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1982). While section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982), which bars all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, would
extend by its terms to post-employment restraint agreements, the Supreme Court's recent
rejection of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, see Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Co., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984), suggests that employers could not be sued under section 1
over such agreements. Section 2, however, applies to unilateral action when monopoly is
achieved or attempted. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Because post-employment restraints are only
potentially anticompetitive where significant market power already exists, section 2 should
provide a basis for antitrust liability where actual competitive harm is threatened.
8 See, e.g., Schmidl v. Central Laundry & Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823 (Sup. Ct.
1939) (English and American precedent indicate that the liberty of the employee is of pri-
mary importance in assessing the policy implications of post-employment restraint agree-
ments); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 692 (Ohio C.P. 1952)
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cludes freedom of contract, and the freedom to contract by
definition allows the voluntary restriction of one's options. 9 In-
deed, all contracts, by imposing obligations, limit choices to some
extent. Nevertheless, agreements between competent parties are
enforced routinely and without judicial inquiry into whether one or
the other party got the better of the bargain;60 in order to justify
the special treatment accorded post-employment restraint agree-
ments, some characteristic peculiar to the employment relationship
needs to be found."1
The employee-protection argument implicitly assumes that
employees as a class are unable to protect themselves against over-
reaching by employers: if employees are able to secure adequate
consideration for the options they relinquish, then clearly no pro-
tection, beyond that provided under general contract rules, is
needed.6 2 Accordingly, the courts that have formulated this ration-
ale have usually attributed the need for judicial protection of em-
ployees to a perceived inequality of bargaining power between the
parties.6 3 Other cases imply that employees as a group are less so-
(courts ask whether the agreement is "unduly harsh and oppressive on the employee").
1' Not everyone accepts autonomy as the normative basis for contract law; some com-
mentators favor the use of contract law to advance paternalistic or distributive goals. See,
e.g., Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Spe-
cial Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. Rv. 563
(1982); Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Kronman, Distributive Justice]; Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Con-
tracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Kronman, Paternalism and Contracts].
Under such an agenda, an independent judicial determination of reasonableness may be not
only permissible, but desirable. See also Comment, Covenants Not to Compete: A Survey of
Kansas and Missouri Law, 53 UMKC L. REv. 237, 256 (1985) (arguing that the present
reasonableness inquiry should be made even more protective of employees).
60 See 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 6, § 127 (courts do not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration in the absence of special circumstances indicative of fraud, mistake, or undue
influence).
6' While some courts have drawn an analogy to the prohibition against selling oneself
into slavery, e.g., Oak Cliff Ice Delivery Co. v. Peterson, 300 S.W. 107, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927) (special scrutiny necessary to avoid "industrial servitude"), the nature of the restraint
is fundamentally different. Rather than compelling labor, such agreements merely restrict
the options of the former employee in selecting a new place of employment.
62 Even if employees as a class are disadvantaged, this basis for disparate treatment is
valid only if paternalism is a legitimate reason for interfering with private contracts. Cf.
Kronman, Paternalism and Contracts, supra note 59, at 765 (arguing that paternalism is a
valid reason for contract regulation). But even if, as a normative matter, paternalism may be
an appropriate basis for invalidating contracts, the kinds of employees most likely to enter
into post-employment restraint agreements are in no need of such protection. See infra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle, 317 F. Supp. 633, 638 (W.D. La. 1970) (une-
qual bargaining power limits an agreement's weight in assessment of whether employee
knew secret business information was at stake); Schmidl v. Central Laundry & Supply Co.,
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phisticated than employers, and thus may not be able to judge
what is in their own best interest. 4
Quantifying bargaining power or sophistication, which is nec-
essary for assessing the validity of these assumptions, is difficult.
6 5
13 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823-24 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ("inequality in bargaining power... have [sic] led
the Courts to require a stronger degree of necessity before enforcing a covenant not to la-
bor" as opposed to a covenant regarding the sale of a business); Arthur Murray Dance Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 704 (Ohio C.P. 1952) ("The average, individual em-
ployee has little but his labor to sell or to use to make a living. He is often in urgent need of
selling it and in no position to object to boiler plate restrictive covenants placed before him
to sign."). But see Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982) (bargaining strength
found to be sufficiently equal to allow enforcement of a liquidated damages clause in a post-
employment restraint agreement).
64 See, e.g., Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 253, 108 A. 541, 543 (1919)
(restraints incident to the sale of a business treated more leniently than post-employment
restraints because of greater "parity in ability to negotiate"); Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelsen,
186 Minn. 483, 484-85, 243 N.W. 701, 702 (1932) (citing disparity of sophistication between
Standard Oil and an unskilled laborer in refusing to enjoin breach of noncompetition
agreement).
The general principles of contract law provide better guidance to evaluate inequities of
bargaining power or sophistication. The grounds for invalidation of other types of contracts
fall, roughly, into two groups: those related to the failure of the parties to fulfill the proce-
dural requirements of contract formation and those related to the capacity of the parties to
contract. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 4.1, at 213 (characterizing this dichotomy as
one between behavior, which focuses on the conduct of the bargaining process, and status,
which focuses on the parties' characteristics). Contract invalidation based upon inequality of
bargaining power is most clearly analogous to the procedural defect of duress. A person's
economic condition may be sufficiently perilous that he has no real alternative to accepting
employment on the terms offered. The duress doctrine as it now stands, however, does not
extend to economic pressure, see, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289,
300-05 (1942) (rejecting government's argument that pressing need for ships during World
War II resulted in shipbuilding contracts that were the product of economic duress), and its
application to post-employment restraint agreements, by almost presuming them to be the
product of duress, is anomalous. Moreover, in the extreme case, where the employee truly is
forced to accept the employment agreement involuntarily, the generally applicable doctrine
of unconscionability would provide sufficient protection. See infra notes 85-91 and accompa-
nying text. A claim of lack of sophistication is analogous to the common law doctrine of
incapacity. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 4.2, at 214 (incapacity is "an inability to
participate meaningfully in the bargaining process"). An employee who is so unsophisticated
that he cannot appreciate the nature of the restriction may be viewed as lacking the capac-
ity to assent meaningfully to the terms offered. See Kronman, Distributive Justice, supra
note 59, at 478-83 (lack of capacity to assent in a meaningful way underlies all claims of
coercion by those seeking to invalidate contracts). It must be rare, however, that an adult
employee who is so valuable that his employer will seek an agreement restricting his post-
employment opportunities will also be incapable of freely and knowingly entering into a
contract.
65 Viewing bargaining power in purely economic terms, for example, ignores the subjec-
tive element inherent in all negotiations. The strength of each party's desire to reach an
agreement and the strength of any conflicting desires or considerations influence the relative
bargaining position of each. An indifferent buyer is presumably willing to pay less for a
product than is an eager one, and an anxious seller presumably will accept less than an
indifferent one. While lack of resources may preclude some from bargaining for an item at
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Even confidence in judges' ability to quantify inequities and draw
a line to indicate when they are excessive would not necessarily
justify a presumption of invalidity. Most contracts are negotiated
by parties with unequal bargaining power and unequal shrewdness,
yet courts do not invalidate or rewrite ordinary contracts on these
grounds.6 6 Therefore, one must find additional factors to justify
the refusal to apply, in the post-employment restraint cases, the
rules generally applicable to contracts between competent persons.
There are two possible explanations. First, the relative bargaining
positions or sophistication of the parties may be considered so dis-
proportionate that inequities sufficient to render the agreements
unenforceable, under general contract principles, exist in enough
cases to justify the costs of a reasonableness inquiry. Second, the
values sought to be protected-freedom to engage in the work of
one's choice and to alter that decision at will-may be thought suf-
ficiently powerful to justify the costs of heightened scrutiny re-
gardless of the frequency with which overreaching occurs.
An assessment of the kinds of employees likely to enter into
express post-employment restraint agreements suggests that the
fear that these employees are unable to protect themselves is mis-
placed. 7 Generally, information worth protecting by contract is,
because of its value, not widely dispersed throughout a firm. 8 One
can expect that sensitive information would tend to be in the pos-
session of more highly skilled employees. To the extent that such
employees can be presumed to be relatively sophisticated and to
all, bargaining strength cannot be measured in purely economic terms beyond this threshold
point. The subjective element of bargaining power may account for the absence of unequal
bargaining power as a ground for interference with contractual terms at common law. See R.
POSNER, supra note 8, at 87 (the concept of bargaining power is meaningless as a guide to
the enforceability of contracts).
46 The open-ended unconscionability grounds for invalidation, both under the equita-
ble doctrine, see Coles v. Trecothick, 32 Eng. Rep. 592, 597 (1804) (equity will not grant
specific performance of an agreement which "shocks the conscience"), and under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) (quoted infra note 86), can be used to take
these factors into account in extreme cases. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
"I See Kitch, supra note 40, at 687-88 (accepted use of post-employment restraint pro-
visions in professional sports, entertainment, and military enlistment contracts undercuts
incapacity justification for presumptive invalidity). Of the three examples cited by Kitch,
military enlistment is the most interesting. The other two might be distinguished from the
bulk of post-employment restraint agreements by the relative wealth and sophistication of
employees engaged in sports and entertainment. Many military recruits, however, almost
certainly do not fully appreciate the consequences of a binding commitment to military ser-
vice; absent clear incapacity, such agreements are enforced.
65 Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482 (1974) (trade-secret protec-
tion enhances economic efficiency by allowing "dispersion of responsibilities for creative de-
velopments" throughout large firms).
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have alternative employment opportunities, the fear of overreach-
ing by employers diminishes.6 9 While not all employees with access
to valuable information may be considered to fall into this class,7 0
the issue is not whether employers ever have the incentive and op-
portunity to overreach in using these agreements, but whether the
circumstances in which such overreaching is successful exist fre-
quently enough to warrant the costs of a reasonableness inquiry.
The issue is not whether employees ought to be protected in the
event of overreaching, but whether one should presume that over-
reaching is widespread.
The special treatment accorded post-employment restraints,
to the extent that it depends on the relative bargaining strengths
of the parties, is puzzling in its protection of persons who are able,
ex ante, to assess the desirability of the terms, who are able to
foresee the consequences of such terms, and who are free not to
contract if the terms are sufficiently unfavorable. Even under the
common law doctrines excusing performance by reason of mutual
mistake or impossibility, the mistake or impossibility must have
become known after the contract was made, and must have been
unforeseeable, in order for performance to be excused.1  Thus, in a
69 See, e.g., Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 843-44 (D. Conn.
1976) (multinational restriction reasonable in part because sophisticated employee freely
chose to accept sensitive position with knowledge of restrictive covenant). But see, e.g.,
Reading Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Bertolet, 454 Pa. 488, 311 A.2d 628 (1973) (agreement not to
compete found unenforceable despite the employee's having been chairman of the board,
president, and a large stockholder of his corporate employer). Even highly sophisticated
employees with numerous employment options may, however, have little bargaining power
where use of post-employment restraint agreements is industry-wide. Because such employ-
ees could apply their skills in other industries, the competition among industries for skilled
workers should limit this form of overreaching. The antitrust laws provide additional pro-
tection. See supra note 44.
70 For example, low-level manufacturing employees may have access to machinery or
processes that constitute trade secrets. Much early twentieth-century trade-secret litigation
involved such employees. See supra note 1.
71 The excuse doctrines rest upon the notion that contracts are negotiated under im-
plicit assumptions, and performance may be excused if the assumptions are later found to
have been incorrect. For example, in Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887),
the court allowed rescission of a contract for the sale of a cow because the mutual assump-
tion that the cow was barren turned out to be mistaken. For more recent cases discussing
the mistake doctrine, see Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1972) (poor
prediction of one party's future earnings does not excuse performance under the mistake
doctrine); Dover Pool & Racquet Club, Inc. v. Brooking, 366 Mass. 629, 633-34, 322 N.E.2d
168, 170-71 (1975) (mistaken assumptions regarding applicable zoning laws are grounds for
excusing performance).
In Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863), the court reasoned that the continued
existence of a concert hall was an implied condition of a contract to rent the hall, thus
excusing performance, on the ground of impossibility, when the hall was destroyed by fire.
For more recent impracticability cases, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.P.C., 563 F.2d 588, 598-600
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legal system in which great importance is usually attached to the
notion of fault,72 it is surprising that a post-employment restraint
agreed upon with knowledge of one's disadvantage is more easily
avoided than a contract in which foreknowledge was impossible.
This incongruity suggests that the differential treatment of
post-employment restraints is explained not by a defect in the for-
mation of these contracts, but by the perception that the freedom
to seek employment is so important a right that agreements re-
stricting its exercise, even if entered into deliberately and know-
ingly, should be enforced only with considerable caution, regardless
of the increased transaction costs.7 s While this argument may ex-
plain the reasonableness inquiry, it does not justify it. This solici-
tous treatment of employees assumes that they are both fungible
and overabundant. If the employees most likely to enter into these
agreements are sophisticated persons who can bargain with various
employers for the best available terms, the social loss from this
excess of caution may well exceed the gain. Such persons have
given up a valuable right, but they have freely bargained for the
contract and have been compensated for accepting the terms. Al-
though the current rule works to the advantage of true victims of
overreaching, the protection afforded is overinclusive. Enforcement
of this class of contracts according to general contract principles
would not deprive skilled, sophisticated workers of any freedom
that they did not freely bargain away. As for those employees who
so lacked other job opportunities that assent in a real sense may
not have been given, the general principles of modern contract law
would protect them adequately.7 4
(3d Cir. 1977) (economic inability to perform does not constitute impracticability); Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1323-24 (E.D. La.
1981) (unanticipated loss of profits does not render contract unenforceable on impracticabil-
ity grounds unless especially severe and unreasonable); see also U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978) (codi-
fying doctrine in terms of failure of presupposed condition). Because these doctrines apply
only where a mutual implied assumption is or turns out to be incorrect, they do not extend
to situations in which one party merely has second thoughts about tlie wisdom of his
bargain.
71 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 28 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the history of the fault concept in tort law); W.
LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 27 (1972) (discussing the mens rea re-
quirement in criminal law); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 152-
53 (1973) (despite an early preference for strict liability in tort at early common law, fault
was generally required for tort liability by the nineteenth century).
7- See Blake, supra note 37, at 650 (the values at issue are social or political rather
than economic); see also Oak Cliff Ice Delivery Co. v. Peterson, 300 S.W. 107, 111 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927) (discussing the "inherent right to labor").
"' See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
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C. The Loss-to-Society Rationale
Another reason sometimes offered as a justification for the
harsh treatment of post-employment restraints is that society
should not be deprived of the services of one of its productive
members. In eighteenth-century England, this concern may have
been legitimate. Because of the smaller population, 5 the impact of
the various plagues that devastated the English population during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,7 6 and limited labor mo-
bility, the removal of a skilled person from the work force, even if
beneficial to the parties, might have exacted significant social
costs. Moreover, the guild system made it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for a displaced employee to change occupations. 77
Under present-day economic conditions, however, this ration-
ale does not support the disparate treatment of express post-em-
ployment restraint agreements. 7 There is no general shortage of
labor, and shortages of workers with any given skill can be reme-
died by training others.79 Although in a literal sense society is de-
prived by these agreements of the benefit of having a skilled
worker engaged in a given trade,80 the agreements do not, as they
"I The population of England in 1700 has been estimated at 5,134,516. By 1880, this
figure had risen to 25,480,161. WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY
AND COMMERCE 465-66 (1885).
" Although the initial outbreak of bubonic plague struck England in the mid-four-
teenth century, the disease, once introduced into the country, frequently returned. See ED-
WARD CHEYNEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 101-
04 (1916).
7 See generally STELLA KRAMER, THE ENGLISH CRAFT GILDS (1927). Cf. Blake, supra
note 37, at 637 (per se rule of the Dyer's Case was an attempt to preserve the status of the
craft guilds by precluding the alteration of the customary master-apprentice relationship).
7' See Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio C.P.
1952) (changes in the law governing post-employment restraints are attributable to changed
"social, economic, industrial, communication and transportational" conditions); Blake,
supra note 37, at 638 (industrial revolution lessened the barriers to individuals' shifting
occupations and increased the geographic mobility of workers, thereby lessening the harsh-
ness of post-employment restraints).
' In fact, labor-shortage problems had disappeared at least by the turn of the twenti-
eth century. See Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R.I. 3, 6-7, 19 A. 712, 713 (1890) (comparing
late-nineteenth-century American employment conditions with those of eighteenth-century
England).
80 Although, with the demise of the trade guilds, a post-employment restraint may not
completely bar a person from working, a loss to society will result if he is unable to put his
talents to their optimal uses. The extent of the resultant welfare loss depends upon the
frequency with which an employee's skills are so specialized that they are worth considera-
bly more to one industry than to another. The welfare loss incident to post-employment
restraints is thus analogous to that which arises from monopsony, i.e., it only occurs where
the value of the input is particularly high in one industry. See supra note 44. Because em-
ployees with such specialized skills will earn less under a post-employment restraint than
Post-Employment Restraint Agreements
might have in the eighteenth century, preclude gainful employ-
ment of the worker.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT OF POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINT AGREE-
MENTS ACCORDING TO GENERAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES
The preceding analysis indicates that no persuasive rationale
has been advanced for subjecting post-employment restraint agree-
ments to an independent judicial determination of reasonableness.
In the absence of such a showing, the well-established principles
that ordinarily govern contracts between competent parties should
be applied to these agreements. This is not to say that employer
misconduct should go unchecked-on the contrary, the doctrine of
unconscionability provides an appropriately limited mechanism for
protecting employees in those narrow circumstances where judicial
scrutiny of contracts is actually justified.
The nineteenth-century notion of sanctity of contract com-
pelled enforcement absent a verifiable and recognized excuse.81
Unless physical duress, fraud, mental incapacity, or infancy could
be shown, traditional contract principles required an employee to
live with the bargain he made, regardless of how disadvantageous
the terms.8 2 Like the refusal to assess the sufficiency of considera-
tion, the refusal to examine the fairness of contracts stemmed in
part from the difficulty of conducting such a subjective inquiry.83
Conceptually more significant, however, was the notion of freedom
of contract. As has often been said, the freedom to contract in-
cludes the "freedom to make a bad bargain. '8 4 Under such a re-
gime, employer overreaching through the use of express post-em-
ployment restraints, absent some procedural irregularity, could not
be remedied.
Despite the conceptual elegance of the nineteenth-century
view of contract, courts eventually began to examine the substan-
tive terms of contracts in cases of extreme unfairness. Under the
doctrine of unconscionability, as it originated in the nineteenth
century, an agreement that "shocked the conscience" would not be
they would otherwise, they have an incentive to renegotiate with their former employers,
thus removing the welfare loss in those relatively rare cases in which it would otherwise
arise.
81 See P. ATIYAH, supra note 7, at 388-89 (discussing the rise of formalism and the de-
cline of equity in the nineteenth century).
'2 See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 4.1; Epstein, supra note 6, at 315.
"' See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
61 E.g., Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Mo. 1972).
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enforced in a court of equity."5 The twentieth-century notion of
unconscionability is codified in section 2-302 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.86 This provision and the cases decided thereunder
offer guidance as to what conduct is to be deemed unconscionable.
Although the text of the Code contains no explicit definition of the
term,"7 the official commentary states as the basic test "whether, in
the light of the general commercial background and the commer-
cial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are
so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances ex-
isting at the time of the making of the contract." 8 This concern
with the one-sidedness of the terms of an agreement suggests that
unconscionability may provide a means of preventing employer
overreaching within the general framework of contract law.
The cases decided under section 2-302 afford a clearer picture
of the relevant considerations in an unconscionability inquiry. The
most influential judicial statement of what constitutes unconscio-
nability combines both the procedural and substantive aspects of
the term. In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,90 the
85 See, e.g., Marks v. Gates, 154 F. 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1907) (grant, in discharge of in-
debtedness, of contingent interest in an undetermined sum held unconscionable); Coles v.
Trecothick, 32 Eng. Rep. 592, 597 (1804) (stating the traditional "shock the conscience" test
for equitable unconscionability). For a criticism of unconscionability as a standard by which
to judge the substantive fairness of contract terms, see Epstein, supra note 6, at 293-95.
88 U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconsciona-
ble clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
Although limited by its terms to sales transactions, section 2-302 has been extended by
analogy to render other types of contracts unenforceable. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil
Co., 257 Ind. 458, 461-64, 276 N.E.2d 144, 146-48 (1971) (gas station lease); Zapatha v. Dairy
Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 291-94, 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375-77 (1980) (franchise agreement);
see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985) (statutory extension); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (discussing unconscionability in terms of U.C.C. article 2 but
without limiting its scope to sales transactions).
87 Because it facilitates the application of the doctrine to unforeseen instances of unfair
bargaining, this failure to define the term is considered by some to be a virtue. See, e.g.,
Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 814-15 (1969).
88 U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1978).
89 The procedural/substantive distinction, first set forth in Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 485, 487-89 (1967), has been
widely adopted. See, e.g., Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A
New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1981) (discussing the
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District of Columbia Circuit stated that unconscionability includes
"an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party."91 The "absence of meaningful choice" standard
would prevent interference with post-employment restraints for
skilled and sophisticated employees, and the "unreasonably
favorable" prong of the test would permit a reasonableness inquiry
in the occasional case involving a genuinely disadvantaged
employee.
CONCLUSION
The reasonableness approach to post-employment restraint
agreements, which is contrary to the general rule that courts will
not examine the substantive fairness of contract terms, has re-
mained virtually unchanged since 1711, although the stated ratio-
nales for this approach no longer withstand analysis. Post-employ-
ment restraint agreements are not anticompetitive per se, and in
fact may foster competition by affording employers needed protec-
tion for confidential business information or investments in train-
ing. The fact that such agreements are most likely to be used with
high-level employees and in industries involving complex technolo-
gies suggests that employer overreaching is not pervasive enough
to warrant special treatment of these contracts as a class. And, fi-
nally, because of social and economic changes, there is little likeli-
hood that these agreements exact significant societal costs. Be-
cause contracts that are anticompetitive can be invalidated under
the antitrust laws, and because the doctrine of unconscionability
doctrine in these terms while criticizing Leff's analysis); Epstein, supra note 6, at 305-06.
The former term refers to the fairness of the negotiations, and the latter refers to the fair-
ness of the terms ultimately agreed upon.
90 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
91 Id. at 449. A similar standard was applied in Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 544, 279
A.2d 640, 652 (1971) ("The intent of the [unconscionability] clause is not to erase the doc-
trine of freedom of contract, but to make realistic the assumption of the law that the agree-
ment has resulted from real bargaining between parties who had freedom of choice and
understanding and ability to negotiate in a meaningful fashion."), and in Allen v. Michigan
Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 637, 171 N.W.2d 689, 692 (1969) ("Implicit in the principle
of freedom of contract is the concept that at the time of contracting each party has a realis-
tic alternative to acceptance of the terms offered."). See generally Hilman, supra note 89,
at 4-5 (suggesting that common law assent doctrine provides guidance for cases involving
unconscionable behavior in the bargaining process).
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could adequately protect vulnerable employees, employer excesses
can be restrained without incurring the economic and social costs
of continuing to apply the Mitchel v. Reynolds analysis.
Maureen B. Callahan
